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THE RIGHTS OF PROBATIONARY FEDERAL
EMPLOYEE WHISTLEBLOWERS SINCE THE
ENACTMENT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
REFORM ACT OF 1978
I. Introduction
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 ("CSRA") significantly restructured the federal civil service, abolishing the Civil Service Commission and replacing it with two new agencies. 2 This radical reorganization3 was designed to correct two perceived problems. Congress
believed that incompetent federal employees were too difficult to fire.
At the same time, however, Congress also felt that federal employee
whistleblowers-those who spoke out against wrongdoing or ineffi4
ciency within the government-were too easy to silence.
In keeping with Congress' goal of simplifying procedures for eliminating incompetents, the CSRA continues the traditional rule that a
probationary employee 5 may be fired with a minimum amount of
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101-8913 (Supp. V 1981).
2. S. REP. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEWS 2723, 2727 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 11011105, 1201-1206 (Supp. V 1981); see also text accompanying notes 17-21 infra
(describing the two new agencies and their functions).
3. The Act was the most comprehensive reform of the federal work force in
almost a century. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS at 2723-24; see also Note, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 97, 98-101 (1979)
(discussing previous reforms).
4. Remarks Announcing Administration's Proposals to Congress, 14 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 435, 436-37 (Mar. 2, 1978) (employees have too little protection
for their rights); SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3, 8, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS at 2725, 2730.
5. Upon his first appointment to a competitive position (in general, a position
awarded based on an examination) the civil service worker begins a one-year probationary period, during which time he lacks the civil service equivalent of tenure. See
5 C.F.R. §§ 315.801-.802 (1982) (OPM regulations setting forth when a probationary
period is required and the length thereof); 5 U.S.C. § 3321 (Supp. V 1981) (authorizing probationary period). See also note 6 infra.
This Comment does not discuss separately the rights of the tenured employee who
is serving a probationary period on initial appointment to a supervisory or managerial position. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.901-909 (1982) (OPM regulations); 5 U.S.C. §
3321(a)(2), (b) (Supp. V 1981). These provisions, created by the CSRA, require an
employee to serve a single probationary period when promoted to his first supervisory
position, and another single probationary period when first assigned to a managerial
position. 5 C.F.R. § 315.904 (1982). The length of this probationary period is
determined individually by each agency. Id. § 315.905. If the employee's agency
determines that his managerial or supervisory performance during this probationary
period is not satisfactory, the agency may reassign him to a lower position in the
agency. The only restriction on this reassignment is that the salary and grade of the
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procedural red tape when his employing agency determines he is not
performing adequately. 6 The purpose of this rule is to make sure the
worker is competent before he is granted the tenure rights that go with
permanent employee status. 7 Among the tenure rights granted to
permanent employees but withheld from probationers under the
CSRA is the right to appeal a dismissal within the administrative
appeals procedure set up by the Act. 8 Thus, at the same time that the
CSRA creates new rights for most federal employees, including probationers, who "blow the whistle," the Act's protections against reprisal
are not all available to probationers."
Compared to the entire work force in the executive branch of the
federal government,10 the approximately 100,000 probationers per
year1 1 may seem insignificant. Nevertheless, given that forty-five percent of federal employees questioned in a recent survey said they had
observed one or more instances of "illegal or wasteful activity" in the
government within the preceding year, 12 probationers should be encouraged to expose such activity when they encounter it.
new position must not be lower than those of the employee's position before his
promotion. Id. § 315.907. If a supervisor or manager is demoted according to these
rules during this probationary period, he has no right to directly appeal the demotion. Id. § 315.908. Like the non-tenured probationers discussed in this Comment,
his protection against retaliation for whistleblowing is limited. See notes 40-66 infra
and accompanying text for a discussion of the limited appeal rights accorded probationers under the CSRA.
6, The probationer's untenured status is reflected in the exclusion of probationers from the definition of "employee" in the CSRA at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511 and 4303(f)
(Supp. V 1981). OPM regulations regarding untenured probationers are set out at
5 C.F.R. §§ 315.801-806 (1982). See notes 40-66 infra and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Act's limited appeal rights for probationers. It is to be noted that
probationers have enjoyed less protection than tenured employees since about 1912.
Note, supra note 3, at 99; see 5 C.F.R. § 315.803 (1978) (old Civil Service Commission rules); the CSRA did not create the distinction between tenured and probationary employees. As previously noted, the CSRA did create a new class of tenured
probationers-those serving probationary periods following certain promotions. See
note 5 supra.
7. See 5 C.F.R. § 315.803 (1982) (OPM regulation).
8. The probationer does have administrative appeal rights in certain limited
situations. See notes 40-66 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the CSRA
appeals procedures.
9. See notes 40-66 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the CSRA
appeals procedures; see note 34 infra for a list of the employees and situations not
covered by the Act.
10. The executive branch employs approximately 2.7 million workers. Telephone
interview with Ed Shell, OPM Public Information Office (Feb. 23, 1983).
11. Id. This figure does not include tenured employees serving a probationary
period on first appointment to a supervisory or managerial position. Id. See note 5
supra for a discussion of the status of such tenured employees.
12. OFFICE OF MERIT SYSTEMS REVIEW AND STUDIES, MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION
BOARD, WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEE 7
MSPB WHISTLEBLOWING REPORT].

(1981)

[hereinafter

cited

as

PROBA TIONARY WHISTLEBLOWERS
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This Comment focuses on the rights, since the passage of the CSRA,
of the probationary employee who exposes fraud and mismanagement
in the federal government. It reviews the rights granted by the
4
CSRA, 13 as well as non-CSRA rights granted under the Privacy Act,'
and under the first and fifth amendments of the Constitution, 1 5 including the right to sue one's supervisor in a Bivens action.' 6 As will be
demonstrated, non-CSRA rights are particularly important to the
whistleblower who is a probationer. The Comment concludes that the
CSRA does encourage probationers, to an extent, to expose fraud and
wrongdoing in government, but that it does not adequately protect
them when they do so. Greater protection can and should be afforded
probationary whistleblowers without discouraging management from
firing incompetents. Recommended improvements include an increase in the budget of the Office of the Special Counsel-an office set
up by the CSRA to guard the integrity of the federal civil service-and
limited judicial review of that office's administrative decisions.
II. The Civil Service Reform Act
The old Civil Service Commission (CSC) acted as a management
agent for the President, a provider of services and an adjudicatory
board.' 7 Congress believed that the assignment of all these roles to one
commission inevitably led to conflict, which damaged the Commission's performance.' 8 The system set up by the CSRA was designed to
alleviate this problem by dividing the CSC's functions between two
new agencies. The personnel agency functions were to be performed
by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM),' 9 which was to manage the entire civil service system. The quasi-judicial function was
assigned to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) . 2 0 Within the
MSPB, the separate Office of the Special Counsel (OSC) was to act as
2
a prosecutor. '
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
NEWS

See notes
5 U.S.C.
See notes
See notes
SENATE

27-86 infra and accompanying text.
§ 552a (1976); see notes 87-96 infra and accompanying text.
97-184 infra and accompanying text.
137-84 infra and accompanying text.
REPORT, supra note 2, at 5, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

at 2727.

18. Id.
19. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1105 (Supp. V 1981).
20. Id. §§ 1201-1205. The MSPB adjudicates disputes between federal workers
and their agencies.
21. Id. §§ 1204, 1206. Established within the MSPB, OSC is an independent
office designed to receive allegations of "prohibited personnel practices" (defined at
id. § 2302 and including "personnel actions" taken or not taken in retalilation for
whistleblowing, id. § 2302(b) (8)), unlawful political activities, arbitrary withholding
of information requested pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, and any other

57(0
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In addition to restructuring the civil service, the CSRA streamlined
procedures for firing incompetents. 22 Congress believed that the complexity of antiquated civil service rules had made it difficult to fire
those who were not performing. 23 The Act's simplification of procedures was designed to correct this problem. 24 Procedures designed to

illegal activities within the federal civil service. "Personnel actions" are defined at id.
§ 2302(a)(2)(A), and include various disciplinary actions that can be taken against an
employee. See note 36 infra; Frazier v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 672 F.2d 150, 154
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
22. Under the Civil Service Commission, an employee against whom his agency
took action could avail himself of up to five steps of administrative review, Note,
supra note 3, at 103-04, 113, whereas the CSRA allows for internal agency review
followed (in some but not all cases) by one appeal to the MSPB. 5 U.S.C. §§ 75017702 (Supp. V 1981); Note, supra note 3, at 113. See notes 40-66 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the appeals process provided for probationers.
The old performance evaluation system, abolished by the CSRA, required that
employees be rated either unsatisfactory, satisfactory or outstanding. 5 U.S.C. § 4304
(1976). These ratings did not affect the determination of within-grade salary increases and an "unsatisfactory" rating was appealable by the employee even if no
action was taken against him. Furthermore, an employee given an "unsatisfactory"
rating could not be removed without a procedure that was generally long and
aggravating for all concerned. The result was that supervisors gave few "unsatisfactory" ratings. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 39-40, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2761-62. Of course, "satisfactory" ratings in the record would
make it harder to prove incompetence later.
The CSRA allows greater flexibility by requiring agencies to develop their own
performance appraisal systems. 5 U.S.C. § 4302 (Supp. V 1981). These systems use
the results of performance appraisals as a basis for rewarding employees with training, pay and rank. Id. § 4302(a)(3). Performance appraisals are given based on
standards, developed under OPM regulations, that use objective criteria to evaluate
job performance. Id. § 4302(b)(1). For a general summary of the changes the CSRA
made to limit judicial review of administrative decisions, discussed at note 60 infra
and accompanying text, to streamline the appeals process within the civil service,
and to create more flexibility in the performance evaluation system, see Note, supra
note 3, at 103-05, 107-10, 113-14.
23. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 2725.
24. See note 22 supra. Certain federal employees contended that mere simplification of procedures was not certain to assure the removal of more incompetents from
the civil service. See, e.g., Civil Service Reform: Hearingson H.R. 11280 Before the
House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 532 (1978)
(statement of A.E. Fitzgerald) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. Congress assumed that procedures existed at the time whereby whistleblowers could be removed
or rendered ineffective. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2730. In fact, such procedures did exist. They were
summarized in a manual, written during the Nixon administration, which was
reportedly also used during the Carter administration. The procedures included
forced transfers to other parts of the country, and removal of any meaningful
authority from the unwanted employee. Note, supra note 3, at 105 n.73 (citing
Sturm, Can Carter Get the Civil Service to Shape Up?, FORBES, Feb. 6, 1978, at 42).
Given the existence of these procedures, it might be asked why such procedures were
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facilitate the removal of incompetents, however, can also be used
against whistleblowers. The most common form of reprisal taken
against government employee whistleblowers is the granting of poor
can lead to disperformance ratings. 25 Low performance ratings
26
missal, suspension or demotion for incompetence.
Congress intended the CSRA to protect whistleblowers from such
retaliation. For the first time, the Act codifies "merit system principles" upon which federal personnel policies are to be based. 27 One of
these principles is that whistleblowers should be protected against
reprisal for legal disclosure of information which they reasonably
believe shows mismanagement or illegal activity. 2 The Act defines
certain "prohibited personnel practices" in which it is unlawful for
any supervisor to engage. 29 Among these prohibited practices is the
taking of any of certain specified actions against an employee in
reprisal for whistleblowing. 30 Specifically, a supervisor or manager 3'
shall not, with respect to his authority .

.

. take or fail to take a

personnel action 32 with respect to any employee . . . as a reprisal

not being used to remove incompetents. See House Hearings, supra, at 532. The
answer, it was argued, was that senior management was not highly motivated to act
against incompetents. Id. Congress nevertheless chose to believe that simplified
procedures would encourage the firing of incompetents.
25. MSPB WHISTLEBLOWING REPORT, supra note 12, at 37.
26. See note 22 supra.
27. See 5 U.S.C. § 2301 (Supp. V 1981); Note, supra note 3, at 110.
28. 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(9) (Supp. V 1981), which states: "Employees should be
protected against reprisal for the lawful disclosure of information which the employees reasonably believe evidences-(A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or
(B) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to public health or safety."
29. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (Supp. V 1981).
30. Id. § 2302(b)(8).
31. The statute uses the words "[a]ny employee who has authority to take, direct
others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action .... " Id. § 2302(b).
32. The covered "personnel actions" are enumerated in id. § 2302(a)(2)(A), and
include an appointment, a promotion, disciplinary action under chapter 75 of 5
U.S.C., or other disciplinary or corrective action, a detail (a temporary assignment
to another position), transfer (movement without a break in service from a position in
one agency to a position in another, see 5 C.F.R. § 210.102(18) (1982)), or reassignment (lateral movement from one position within an agency to another position in
the same agency, see id. § 210.102(12)), a reinstatement (noncompetitive reemployment to serve as a career or career-conditional employee, when the employee formerly had competitive status or was serving probation when separated from the
service, see id. § 210.102(15)), a restoration (return to an agency of a person separated, furloughed, or given a leave of absence because of military duty or injury, see
id. §§ 353.101-.501), a reemployment (see id. §§ 351.1001-1005, 352.201-.209), a
performance evaluation (under chapter 43 of 5 U.S.C.), a decision concerning pay,
benefits, or awards, or concerning education or training if the education or training
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for a disclosure of information by an employee . . . which the
employee . . . reasonably believes evidences . . . a violation of any
law, rule, or regulation or ...mismanagement, a gross waste of
funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to
public health or safety . . .33
Any such whistleblowing disclosure by an "employee" or "applicant
for employment" is protected 4 if made to the Special Counsel of the
MSPB or to the Inspector General of an agency or other employee
designated by an agency head to receive disclosures of this sort. 35 Even
if the disclosure is made to a person other than those listed above, the
employee who makes it is protected unless such a disclosure is specifically prohibited by law, or the information disclosed was specifically
required by executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or the conduct of foreign affairs. 36 In short, with the rare
exceptions just stated, disclosure to any person of information which
the employee reasonably believes fits the quoted definition is pro-

may reasonably be expected to lead to an appointment, promotion, performance
evaluation, or other "personnel action," and any other significant change in duties or
responsibilities which is inconsistent with the employee's salary or grade level. See
Vaughn, Statutory Protection of Whistleblowers in the Federal Executive Branch,
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 635-37 (1982), for a discussion of the coverage of this
provision (5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1981))-suggesting that doubts as to the
breadth of the coverage of the terms listed above should be resolved in favor of
coverage so as to be more protective of whistleblowers. It should be noted that the
Act did not include "reduction in force"-a discharge or demotion resulting from a
management reorganization-among the acts of reprisal prohibited by this provision.
See Vaughn, supra, at 635-36.
33. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (Supp. V 1981). This provision also applies to an
"applicant for employment." Id.
34. It should be noted that the following agencies are not covered under the part
of the Act dealing with prohibited personnel practices: The Central Intelligence
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and, at the
President's determination, any executive agency or unit whose principal function is to
conduct foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities. Government corporations are also not covered. Id. § 2302(a)(2)(C). Prohibited personnel practices within
the Federal Bureau of Investigation are covered under a special section. Id. § 2303.
Also excluded from coverage under the Act are many confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating positions. Id. § 2302(a)(2)(B). Included
under the CSRA provisions are all positions in the competitive service (positions
awarded by competitive examination), id. § 2302(a)(2)(B), career appointees in the
Senior Executive Service (see id. 99 3132(a)(2), (4); the Senior Executive Service is a
group of high-ranking government managers created by the CSRA. A career appointee to the Senior Executive Service is appointed with the approval of OPM), id.
§ 2302(a)(2)(B), and most positions in the excepted service (in general, positions not
in the competitive service. See 5 C.F.R. § 1.3, 1.4 (1982) (OPM regulations)). 5
U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (Supp. V 1981).
36. Id.
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tected. This is true whether the disclosure is made by a probationer or
37
by a tenured employee.
The Act provides penalties 3 for those responsible for any personnel
action taken as a reprisal for disclosures made by whistleblowers.
These penalties may include "removal, reduction in grade, debarment
from Federal employment for a period not to exceed 5 years, suspension, reprimand, or an assessment of a civil penalty not to exceed
$1000," and may be imposed in a final order of the MSPB. 39 Significantly, the MSPB has power to enjoin a retaliatory action by an
employing agency before it occurs. 40 If OSC reasonably believes that a
prohibited personnel action is to be, or has been, taken as a result of a
prohibited personnel practice, it may request that the MSPB stay the
agency action. 4
A. Chapter 77 Appeals
There are two ways for a whistleblower's case to reach the MSPB.
The first is through a "chapter 77" appeal. 42 This appeal is brought

37. Construction of this provision to protect probationers is logical, since a
failure to protect disclosures by probationers would allow reprisals for whistleblowing, something the Act was intended to prevent. Thus, in this section, the fact
that another section of the Act, id. § 7511(a)(1)(A), defines the term "employee" so as
to exclude probationers, has not at all discouraged the District of Columbia Circuit
Court from concluding that whistleblower-type disclosures by probationers are protected under the same provision that protects disclosures by tenured employees. See
Wren v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 681 F.2d 867, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Borrell v.
United States Int'l Communications Agency, 682 F.2d 981, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(citing Civil Service Reform Act: Markup Session on S.2460, Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 85-86 (May 22, 1978) (unpublished
transcript) (remarks of Sens. Percy and Chiles) [hereinafter cited as Markup Session]); see also notes 40-66 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of remedies
available to probationers.
38. 5 U.S.C. § 1207(b) (Supp. V 1981).
39. Id.
40. Id. § 1208. When an agency decides to terminate a probationer due to poor
work performance or conduct, it must notify him in writing of the reasons and the
effective date. 5 C.F.R. § 315.804 (1982). The probationer would thus have advance
notice of his agency's action.
41. OSC may request a stay for up to 15 calendar days. 5 U.S.C. § 1208(a)(1)
(Supp. V 1981). If the stay is not denied within three working days of OSC's request,
the stay is granted. Id. § 1208(a)(3). If OSC requests an extension, the Board may
grant one to last up to 30 additional days, or, if the Board concurs in OSC's
determination, after opportunity for comment by OSC and the agency involved, for
any longer period the Board deems proper. Id. § 1208(b), (c). See In re Kass, 2
M.S.P.B. 251, 257-61 (1980) for the Board's determination of the proper standard of
review to be used in granting stays (the longer the stay, the stricter the standard).

42. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7703 (Supp. V 1981).
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directly to the MSPB by an "employee or applicant for employment,"
and may be submitted from "any action which is appealable to the
Board under any law, rule or regulation. ' 43 However, due to the
congressional intent to facilitate the firing of incompetents, 44 a probationer is neither an "employee" '45 nor an "applicant for employment" 46 for the purposes of the basic chapter 77 appeal. The result is
that this direct remedial procedure is not available to the probationer
4
except in certain special cases. 1

43. Id. § 7701(a). The Act provides that MSPB may award attorney's fees to a
prevailing employee in a chapter 77 appeal. Id. § 7701(g); Frazier v. Merit Sys.
Protection Bd., 672 F.2d 150, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
44. Borrell v. United States Int'l Communications Agency, 682 F.2d 981, 988
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (chapter 77 appeal not available to probationers due to congressional intent to protect against incompetents' attempts to halt deserved termination)
(citing Markup Session, supra note 37, at 85-86 (remarks of Sens. Percy and Chiles)).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a) (1) (A) (Supp. V 1981). An "employee" is "an individual in
the competitive service who is not serving a probationary or trial period under an
initial appointment or who has completed 1 year of current continuous employment
under other than a temporary appointment limited to 1 year or less .. ."Id. See
also 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.801-802 (1982) (OPM regulations); Wren v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 681 F.2d 867, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (MSPB has no jurisdiction to hear direct
appeal from probationary whistleblower); Piskadlo v. Veterans' Admin., 668 F.2d
82, 83 (1st Cir. 1982) (same; analyzes the statute to explain why the part of the
statute authorizing "chapter 77" appeals-5 U.S.C. § 7701(a) (Supp. V 1981)-must
be construed to incorporate the definition of "employee" in id. § 7511(a)(1)(A),
which excludes probationers).
46. Piskadlo v. Veterans' Admin., 668 F.2d 82, 84 (1st Cir. 1982) (the "applicant
for employment" language does not authorize either an applicant or a probationer to
appeal directly to the MSPB except in the specific situations in which the statute was
intended to allow direct appeals to the MSPB by such parties-which are cases that
allege discrimination prohibited by specified statutes. These statutes include the
following: § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980)) (discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin),
§ 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976)) (discrimination on basis of sex), § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 791 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980)) (discrimination on basis of handicapping condition), and §§ 12, 15
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. §§ 631, 633a
(Supp. IV 1980)). 5 U.S.C. § 7702 (Supp. V 1981)). See also 5 C.F.R. § 315.806
(1982) (OPM regulation allowing a probationer a chapter 77 appeal when he alleges
his termination was based on specified forbidden criteria, including partisan political
reasons or marital status; this regulation applies only to those non-tenured probationers in the competitive service. Wren v. Department of the Army, 2 M.S.P.B. 174, 174
n.* (1980)).
47. Significantly, the direct appeal is available where a probationer alleges discrimination covered by one of the statutes specified in 5 U.S.C. § 7702 (Supp. V
1981)-which are set out in note 46 supra-or by 5 C.F.R. § 315.806 (1982) (OPM
regulation described in note 46 supra). Another special case in which a whistleblower
may appeal directly to the Board is one in which he was terminated for "conditions
arising before appointment" and alleges that improper procedures were followed. 5
C.F.R. §§ 315.805, 315.806 (1982) (OPM regulations).
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B. Corrective Action Authority of OSC
The second way for a whistleblower's case to reach the MSPB is
through the "corrective action" authority of OSC.48 The CSRA provides that OSC must investigate any allegation of a prohibited personnel practice, 49 at least to the extent necessary to determine whether
the allegation has merit.50 If, in a case involving alleged whistleblowing, 51 OSC determines within fifteen days of receipt of the allegation
that there is a substantial likelihood that the information disclosed by
the alleged whistleblower is protected under the CSRA's whistleblowing provisions, 52 it may require the head of the agency in question to
conduct an investigation of the information furnished by OSC.53 The
agency must then submit its findings to OSC (as well as to the President and Congress) 54 within sixty days or such longer period as OSC
may stipulate in writing.5 5 If the Special Counsel concludes that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that a prohibited personnel practice
has occurred, exists, or is to be taken, and that corrective action is
necessary, he must so report to the MSPB, the agency involved, and
OPM. 56 Upon the agency's failure to take the recommended corrective

48. 5 U.S.C. § 1206 (Supp. V 1981).
49. Defined in id. § 2302; see note 21 supra.
50. 5 U.S.C. § 1206(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981), which provides: "The Special Counsel
shall receive any allegation of a prohibited personnel practice and shall investigate
the allegation to the extent necessary to determine whether there are reasonable
grounds to believe that a prohibited personnel practice has occurred, exists, or is to be
taken." The OSC may also make such an investigation in the absence of an allegation. Id. § 1206(a)(3).
51. As defined in id. § 1206(b)(1). The definition of whistleblowing in this
section is essentially identical to that in id. § 2302(b)(8), discussed at notes 30-37
supra and accompanying text.
52. 5 U.S.C. § 1206(b)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1981); that is, that there is "a substantial
likelihood that the information discloses a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or
mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or substantial and specific
danger to the public health or safety .... Id.
53. OSC is required to furnish the agency head with whistleblowing information
regarding his agency, id. § 1206(b)(2), but may not reveal the whistleblower's
identity, except in the rare case where OSC determines that such a disclosure is
necessary in order to carry out OSC's functions. Id. § 1206(b)(1). OSC may require
the agency head to investigate only in cases where the information was transmitted to
OSC by an "employee," "former employee," or "applicant for employment" in the
agency which the information concerns, or by any employee who obtained the
information in connection with the performance of his duties and responsibilities. Id.
§ 1206(b)(3)(B). The statute sets out the issues required to be addressed in the
agency's report. Id. § 1206(b)(4).
54. Id. § 1206(b)(5)(A).
55. Id. § 1206(b)(3)(A)(ii).
56. Id. § 1206(c)(1)(A).
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action, OSC may request that the Board consider the case. 57 After
OPM and the agency concerned are given opportunity to comment,
the Board may order "such corrective action as [it] considers appropri58
ate."
Assuming the Board gets jurisdiction, it is the final administrative
arbiter of complaints brought to it; 59 a final order or decision of the
MSPB is appealable to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.60 However, because of the unavailability of the chapter 77
appeal in the case of a probationary whistleblower, the Board will not
get jurisdiction if OSC decides not to being a corrective action appeal.6 1 OSC will not bring the appeal unless it believes the Act's goal
of achieving a "fair, efficient, and lawfully-conducted Civil Service"
requires it.6 2 Thus, OSC's decision whether to proceed to a corrective
action petition is based not on the interest of a complaining employee,
but on OSC's perception of the interest of the civil service system as a
whole. A probationary whistleblower appealing to OSC has no way to
63
assure that his complaint will be heard by the Board.
When OSC decides not to bring a corrective action petition to the
Board, probationers have been unsuccessful in getting courts to review

57. Id. § 1206(c)(1)(B).
58. Id. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Board's power to enjoin actions taken by an agency in retaliation for whistleblowing.
59. The Civil Service Commission had a similar role. For a summary of the preCSRA appeals process, see Note, supra note 3, at 104.
60. 5 U.S.C.A. § 7703(b)(1) (West Supp. 1982). Cases involving discrimination
are appealable to the U.S. district court. Id. (Supp. V 1981); see 28 U.S.C. § 2342
(Supp. V 1981); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2342 (West Supp. 1982); Frazier v. Merit Sys.
Protection Bd., 672 F.2d 150, 158-60 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (setting out legislative history). Before October 1982, final decisions of the Board were reviewable by a U.S.
court of appeals, or the Court of Claims. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981). The
procedure for judicial review under the CSRA represents a significant change from
earlier policies under which U.S. district court review was allowed. See Note, supra
note 3, at 113-14. An effect of the Act-in cases not involving discrimination-is to
eliminate the possibility of a new trial in cases, decided by the MSPB, involving a
whistleblower's alleged "unacceptable performance" under 5 U.S.C. §§ 4302-4303
(Supp. V 1981). See 5 U.S.C.A. § 7703(c) (West Supp. 1982); 5 U.S.C. § 7702(e)(3)
(Supp. V 1981).
61. See note 47 supra and text accompanying notes 42-47 supra.
62. Frazier v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 672 F.2d 150, 162 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(upholding the Board's construction of OSC's purpose; OSC is not a "public defender" for federal employees).
63. If the probationer is fortunate enough to be covered by a collective bargaining agreement under 5 U.S.C. § 7121 (Supp. V 1981), he will be able to elect the
protection of negotiated grievance procedures under id. § 7121(a)(1).
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OSC's decision.1 4 Clearly, Congress did not intend to make reviewable
on the merits OSC's decision to terminate its investigation of a whistleblower's complaint.6 5 As the District of Columbia Circuit Court has
concluded, "Congress apparently wanted not only to provide an effective and expeditious process for investigating whistleblower allegations, but also to protect against abuse of that process to halt termination based on unsatisfactory job performance." 6 6
Unfortunately for probationers, OSC's investigation of whistleblower allegations has not been uniformly effective. 7 For example, in
Wren v. Merit Systems ProtectionBoard,"' OSC had closed the probationary whistleblower's case without making even the limited investigation mandated by the Act. 6 Although OSC's reasons for failing to
investigate the alleged whistleblower's complaint 70 were found legally
invalid, 71 the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review OSC's

64. See Wren v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 681 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Borrell v. United States Int'l Communications Agency, 682 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
65. Wren v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 681 F.2d 867, 875 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(citing Markup Session, supra note 37, at 85-86 (remarks of Sens. Percy and Chiles);
A Bill to Reform the Civil Service Laws: Markup Meetings on H.R. 11280, House
Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47 (June-July 1978)
(unpublished transcript)).
66. Borrell v. United States Int'l Communications Agency, 682 F.2d 981, 988
(citing Markup Session, supra note 37, at 85-86 (remarks of Sens. Percy and Chiles)).
67. For a discussion of OSC's problems, see notes 185-200 infra and accompanying text.
68. 681 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
69. Id. at 870-71.
70. When the probationary whistleblower, Wren, wrote to OSC almost a year
after the investigation had been closed to inquire as to the status of her complaint,
OSC finally informed her that the investigation had been closed for failure to file
documents in a "timely" (a term not defined by statute or regulation) manner, and
cited an inapplicable provision of the CSRA to justify the OSC's conclusion that her
case would be more appropriately resolved "'under an administrative appeals procedure or applicable grievance procedure." Id. The inapplicable provision was 5
U.S.C. § 1206(e)(2) (Supp. V 1981), which provides that the Special Counsel shall
make no investigation of any allegation of any "(D) activities prohibited by any civil
service law, rule, or regulation, including any activity relating to political intrusion
in personnel decisionmaking; and (E) involvement by any employee in any prohibited discrimination found by any court or appropriate administrative authority to
have occurred in the course of any personnel action." Based on the legislative history,
the court held this provision was intended to grant OSC authority to investigate other
matters in addition to-and not to detract from-its duty to investigate whistleblower complaints such as Wren's-at least to the extent of determining whether the
complaint is meritorious. 681 F.2d at 874 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1403, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 20 (1978)).
71. 681 F.2d at 875.
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action.7 2 Casting about for some way to enforce OSC's procedural
duty to make an initial investigation, the court speculated that the
petitioner might have an action for mandamus in the district court to
compel some form of inquiry into the merits. 73 The court concluded in
dicta that "the OSC does not have totally unreviewable discretion to
refuse to look at the complaint altogether or to refuse to look at it for
reasons unauthorized by the statute." 74 Since the CSRA was designed
to protect all employees from reprisals for whistleblowing, OSC's
invalid but effective denial of the petitioner's protection cast doubt
upon the "efficacy" of the Act's system for protecting whistleblowers.

75

No court has yet ruled on an attempted mandamus action such as
the Wren court proposed. 76 In deciding whether such a right of action
should be recognized, courts should consider the fact that OSC's role is
patterned after that of the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board. 77 The General Counsel's decision not to bring an
unfair labor practice complaint is generally unreviewable.7 8 Neverthe-

72. Id. at 869.
73. Id. at 875. The question of whether such a mandamus action would lie has
not been passed on by the courts, but the Wren court noted the "'substantial precedent to the effect that federal mandamus does not ordinarily lie under 28 U.S.C. §
1361 to compel prosecutions or even investigations." Id. at 875 n.9. Nevertheless, the
court cited the following cases as authority for the recognition of such a right for a
probationary whistleblower: Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1973); Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1970); Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F.
Supp. 762 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 681 F.2d at 875 n.9.
74. 681 F.2d at 875 n.9.
75. Id. at 875. The Wren case was properly before the circuit court only because
it was an appeal from a decision by the Board. As the court noted, the Board, unlike
OSC, has the power to take "final agency action." Id. at 871 (citing 5 U.S.C. §
1205(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981)). Wren had appealed directly to the Board at the same
time she had registered her complaint with OSC.The Board had found itself without
jurisdiction, id. at 870, and the court reluctantly affirmed the Board's reading of the
statute. Id. at 875.
76. See note 73 supra.
77. Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Service Commission
Reform: Role of Special Counsel (Special Memorandum May 26, 1978), reprintedin
House Hearings, supra note 24, at 819, 820.
78. See Frazier v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 672 F.2d 150, 162 n.41 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (citing George Banta Co. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 611 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir.
1980); Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Irving, 610 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980)). However, precedents suggest that the
charging party may have standing to contest a dismissed complaint or a settlement
between the NLRB and the charged party. Frazier, 672 F.2d at 162 n.41 (citing
International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agriculture Implement Workers v.
Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 210 (1965) (as to dismissed complaint, charging party is
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less, one important difference between OSC and the NLRB's General
Counsel must be kept in mind. The General Counsel performs a
prosecutorial role in connection with employment relations in the
private sector; OSC, by contrast, performs a similar role with respect
to employment relations in the federal government. As part of the
same bureaucratic organization it is supposed to oversee, OSC may
79
lack the independent, unbiased judgment which its role requires.
Thus, it could be argued that even assuming the General Counsel's
decision not to bring an unfair labor practice complaint is completely
unreviewable, limited reviewability of OSC's decision not to file a
corrective action petition is desirable due to the special character of
OSC's role. The reviewability of OSC's failure to act could be confined to cases involving non-tenured whistleblowers, since they are the
ones who have no CSRA remedy other than a corrective action petition by the OSC.
C. Inferring From the CSRA a Private Right of Action
Attempts to infer from the CSRA a private right of action in district
court to enforce directly a whistleblower's protections against retaliation have also been unsuccessful. 80 The first such case to be decided at
the appellate level was Borrell v. United States International Communications Agency (ICA). 81 On her second appeal to the District of

"person aggrieved" for purposes of appeal); Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357
F.2d 527, 536 (3d Cir. 1966) (charging party has right to a hearing on objections to
settlement between Board and charged party); Retail Clerks Union 1059 v. NLRB,
348 F.2d 369, 370 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (same)).
79. See notes 185-200 infra and accompanying text.
80. The relevant CSRA provision would be 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (Supp. V
1981). The Wren court cited the following cases as holding that this provision does
not imply a private right of action for probationary whistleblowers in district court:
Apodaca v. United States Gov't Printing Office, No. 80-2978 (D.D.C. Sept. 16,
1981); Brawner v. United States Dep't of the Navy, No. 80-3195 (D.D.C. April 27,
1981); Cutts v. Ferris, No. 80-1992 (D.D.C. July 29, 1981); Dearsman v. Kurtz, 516
F. Supp. 1255, 1258-59 (D.D.C. 1981); Scarangella v. Schweiker, No. 81-0744
(D.D.C. Aug. 7, 1981). Wren, 681 F.2d at 876 n.9.
81. 682 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Borrell, a former probationary employee,
alleged that she had been discharged from her job with the United States International Communications Agency (ICA) in reprisal for whistleblowing covered by the
Act. Id. at 983; 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (Supp. V 1981), discussed at notes 30-37
supra and accompanying text. The OSC terminated its investigation of Borrell's
allegation, finding that "Borrell's termination was based on certain aspects of her
performance which were determined to be less than satisfactory by her supervisors."
682 F.2d at 985. The District of Columbia Circuit did not appear to read Borrell's
record this way; it noted that Borrell was "one of the first outside professionals to
work in [ICA] for some time," id. at 983, that ICA's own investigation in response to
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Columbia Circuit Court,8 2 the plaintiff, a probationary whistleblower, contended that Congress must not have intended to restrict
probationers to the "illusory" remedy of the statutory allegation to the
OSC.8 3 Noting that the complaining employee is not even a party to
any proceeding initiated by OSC, she argued that the court's failure to
infer a private right of action would mean that Congress had given
84
her a right without a remedy.
The Court, however, found that Congress had not intended to
create a private right of action in district court to enforce restrictions
85
against reprisals for whistleblowing:
Although Congress sought to safeguard all employees, both tenured
and non-tenured, from prohibited personnel practices and thereby

Borrell's allegation had indicated a " 'need to tighten up some management and
contracting procedures within the Exhibits Service,' " id* at 984 n.2, that until
Borrell began to complain about management practices, there had been no complaints from her superiors, and that only one-the last-of four supervisors Borrell
worked under at ICA had given her a less-than-satisfactory work rating. Id. at 984.
Borrell's whistleblowing consisted of complaints to fellow employees about the following improper practices within the agency: "allegedly improper use of repeatedly
extended purchase order contracts for two vendors working on the premises of ICA,
unnecessary and wasteful travel, use of government time by one official for private
real estate transactions, and the improper hiring of the spouse of a senior ICA
employee." Id. at 983-84. Her supervisor recommended to the division chief that
Borrell be transferred. The division chief instead decided to recommend that she be
discharged. Id.
82. After OSC declined to seek a stay of her termination as permitted under the
CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 1208 (Supp. V 1981), discussed at notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text, Borrell next filed a complaint in the district court, which temporarily
delayed the effective date of her termination. See Gilley v. United States, 649 F.2d
449 (6th Cir. 1981) (the CSRA's authorization of OSC to request and of MSPB to
grant stays of personnel actions is not a clear showing of legislative intent to deprive a
federal district court of its equitable power to enjoin a transfer of an employee); but
see Deitch v. Bliss, 512 F. Supp. 605 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (Congress contemplated that
MSPB's stay authority would be exclusive; district court is without jurisdiction to
hear plaintiff employee's request to enjoin his transfer). Subsequently, the court
dismissed Borrell's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, on the ground
that since Borrell's petition was still pending before OSC, she had failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies before turning to the court. 682 F.2d at 984. The circuit
court initially dismissed Borrell's appeal from the district court, but then vacated the
lower court's dismissal order, citing a letter from the OSC, stating that the CSRA
does not require the federal employee to submit his complaint to OSC, and that,
should the employee choose to do so, he would still not be a party to any proceeding
initiated by the MSPB. Id. at 984-85. On remand, after trial, the district court
dismissed the action. Id. at 985.
83. Brief for Appellant at 26, Borrell v. United States Int'l Communications
Agency, 682 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
84. Id. at 26-27.
85. 682 F.2d at 987.
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to insure a "more effective civil service" for the public generally, it
established in the Act a detailed enforcement scheme to effect its
purpose. That scheme allows probationary employees such as appellant relief only through investigation and corrective action by
the OSC.

6

III. The Privacy Act
When a probationary employee whistleblower is terminated or
deprived of rights as a result of an agency's inaccurate record-keeping,
the Privacy Act 8 7 allows the employee to bring a civil action in a
United States district court.88
In Borrell, as the circuit court noted,8 9 the district court apparently
misconstrued the plaihtiff whistleblower's Privacy Act claim. The
district court dismissed her claim, finding that the challenged statements in her personnel file were not disseminated to outside persons
and that they concerned matters within the scope of employment. 0
These holdings led the plaintiff to the conclusion that the district court
believed she was claiming an invasion of privacy. 9 ' As the circuit court
found, she was not; she was merely alleging that ICA officials intentionally kept inaccurate files concerning her performance, which re92
sulted in adverse personnel actions that led to her dismissal.

86. Id. The court went on to note the congressional intent to protect against
abuses by incompetent probationers. Id. at 988. See Vaughn, supra note 32, at 660
n.254 (suggesting that since OSC's decision not to seek corrective action can termi-

nate the rights of a complaining whistleblower, it should be subject to review, but,
given the congressional intent manifested in the CSRA, only under the limited
standard of the Administrative Procedure Act (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976)).

87. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
88. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(C), which provides:
Whenever any agency . . . fails to maintain any record concerning any
individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as
is necessary to assure fairness in any determination relating to the qualifications, character, rights, or opportunities of, or benefits to the individual
that may be made on the basis of such record, and consequently a determination is made which is adverse to the individual . . . the individual may

bring a civil action against the agency, and the district courts of the United
States shall have jurisdiction in the matters under the provisions of this

subsection.
See Borrell v. United States Int'l Communications Agency, 682 F.2d 981, 992 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
89. 682 F.2d at 992.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), (d), (g)(1)(D) (1976).
92. 682 F.2d at 992. See also Savarese v. United States Dep't of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, 479 F. Supp. 304, 306-07 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (summary judgment not granted
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Of course, the whistleblower may have trouble proving the necessary elements of this claim,9 3 but if the claim is established the court
may order an appropriate remedy, which may include costs, fees,
damages, and amendment of the employee's record.9 4 The Privacy Act
provides the same remedies for any specified °s determination not to
amend an individual's record in accordance with his request or for
failure to make the required review of the employee's record.96
IV. Constitutional Remedies: Freedom of Speech and Due Process
A probationary whistleblower who has been fired in retaliation for
speaking out may make a claim that the agency's action has abridged
his first amendment freedom of speech and deprived him of liberty or
property without due process of law-a violation of the fifth amend-

where factual dispute exists as to whether agency's determination of facts in plaintiff
employee's record was made reasonably so as to assure fairness to plaintiff), afJ'd, 620
F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1980); White v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 589 F.2d 713,
714-15 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (evaluations of plaintiff solicited by the Civil Service Commission in connection with plaintiff's application for administrative position are
"records" under the Privacy Act; plaintiff may to some extent be able to get them
modified), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 830 (1980).
93. For the initial burden of proof under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g), see Mervin v. FTC,
591 F.2d 821, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
94. The relevant Privacy Act remedies may be found at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(A),
(B); id. § 552a(g)(4). One court has held that actual damages under the Privacy Act
include damages for psychological as well as pecuniary or physical injury. Parks v.
IRS, 618 F.2d 677, 683 (10th Cir. 1980).
95. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(A) (1976) (citing § 552a(d)(3)).
96. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(A) (1976). Another important means to protect the
whistleblower-without which he might not have access to the information necessary
to establish his case-is the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1976 & Supp. V 1981), which provides:
On complaint, the district court of the United States in the district in
which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in
which the agency records are situated, or in the District of Columbia, has
jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to
order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the
complainant. ...
Id. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
In Borrell, the FOIA was held not violated, 682 F.2d at 993, because the government produced the required documents before the court ordered it to do so. Brief for
Appellant at 43. But see Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(though the government eventually produced the requested document, attorney's fees
may still be awarded). In a case in which the FOIA is held violated, the district court
may award attorney's fees to a substantially prevailing plaintiff. 5 U.S.C. § 552
(a)(4)(E) (1976); see, e.g., Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364-68 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (reviewing legislative history and citing factors to be considered in deciding
whether to award attorney's fees).
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ment. 9' The first issue to be addressed concerning the constitutional
claims of the non-tenured employee is whether the CSRA intended to
eliminate such pre-existing causes of action.9 8 The Borrell court held
that it did not.9 9 The District of Columbia Circuit Court found no
clear congressional statement indicating an intent to displace preexisting remedies for constitutional deprivations. 0 0 Particularly considering the constitutional origin of these rights, 101 the court refused to
infer an intent to replace them with a remedy so limited as that
02
granted probationary employees under the Act. 1
A. First Amendment
When a probationary employee alleges that he was fired in retaliation for constitutionally protected activity, courts apply a standard
derived from Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v.
Doyle'0 3 to determine whether the dismissal was made for proper
reasons. In Mt. Healthy, an untenured teacher at a public school
alleged that the school board's decision not to rehire him was based on
his exercise of first amendment rights in turning over to the press a
memo addressed to various teachers from the school principal. 104 The
Supreme Court held that the burden was initially properly placed on

97. Borrell v. United States Int'l Communications Agency, 682 F.2d 981, 988-89
(D.C. Cir. 1982). See notes 103-84 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of a
probationary whistleblower's first and fifth amendment rights.
98. Borrell, 682 F.2d at 989.
99. Id. at 989-90.
100. Id. at 989. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980); Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1979).
101. Borrell, 682 F.2d at 990.
102. Id. The court reserved the issue of whether the CSRA had precluded the preexisting right of tenured employees to sue on similar constitutional claims in district
court; that is a different issue, since tenured employees may appeal adverse actions
directly to the MSPB, and from there to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
under 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (Supp. V 1981); 5 U.S.C.A. § 7703(b)(1) (West Supp. 1982);
see note 60 supra and accompanying text. Borrell, 682 F.2d at 990.
103. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In Borrell, the circuit court applied its Mazaleski v.
Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1977), standard, which is almost identical to the
Supreme Court's Mt. Healthy standard. Borrell, 682 F.2d at 991. Under the Mazaleski standard, the plaintiff must show that his conduct was constitutionally protected and that it was "a 'substantial' or 'motivating' factor in the government's
adverse action .... " If he does so, the burden shifts to the government to prove by a
"preponderance of the evidence" that it would have reached the same decision had
the protected conduct not occurred. Id. (quoting Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d at
715).
104. 429 U.S. at 282.
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the teacher to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected
and that the conduct was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the
board's decision not to rehire him.10 5 However, these requirements
having been met, the court should then determine whether the board
had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
decided not to rehire the teacher even in the absence of the constitu10 6
tionally protected conduct.
Whether a whistleblower can carry the initial burden of showing
that his disclosures were constitutionally protected by the first amendment guarantee of free speech' 07 depends on the somewhat indefinite
guidelines articulated in Pickering v. Board of Education.108 In that
case, the Supreme Court held that courts must balance the interests of
the public (and of the employee) in the speech of public employees
against those of the government in efficient administration. Only
when the employee's speech is deemed more important is it protected
under the first amendment. 09 For example, where the employee's
speech does not involve a matter of great public interest, there is less
likelihood that the speech is protected by the first amendment. 1 0 The
same is true if the employee has criticized a superior with whom he

105. Id. at 287.
106. Id. See also Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410
(1979) (teacher's private communication with her school principal is protected
speech); see generally Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972) (government
may not deny the benefit of re-employment to a non-tenured teacher on a basis that
infringes his first amendment right of speech).
107. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
108. 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (setting forth factors for consideration in deciding
whether the first amendment protects speech of public employees).
109. See id. at 567-68. See Vaughn, supra note 32, at 637-40, for a brief summary
of case law decided with reference to Pickering. In remanding Borrell's case to the
district court for findings of fact necessary to weigh her first amendment claim, the
court of appeals requested the following information:
specific findings about the nature and truth of Borrell's allegations, the
circumstances and timing of her complaints (including when she began to
complain, to whom she complained, whether and when her complaining
came to the attention of her superiors, and whether others in the agency
were complaining about similar acts within the agency) and the history of
Borrell's work performance (including the nature of the assignments, supervisor ratings, and timing of supervisory evaluations in relation to her
complaints).
682 F.2d at 992.
110. See, e.g., Foster v. Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (employee was
engaged in a power struggle with management and his speech was such that it could
have damaged his employer, the Smithsonian Science Information Exchange).

PROBATIONARY WHISTLEBLOWERS

1983]

must work closely, or his speech has otherwise threatened the discipline or harmony needed in the operation of his office."'
Of course, when the employee is blowing the whistle on corruption
in his office, this Pickering balancing test will usually weigh in favor
of the whistleblower." 2 As the Fifth Circuit, stated in Porter v. CaliJano,

11 3

[a]n employee who accurately exposes rampant corruption in her
office no doubt may disrupt and demoralize much of the office. But
it would be absurd to hold that the First Amendment generally
authorizes corrupt officials to punish subordinates who blow the4
whistle simply because the speech somewhat disrupted the office. "
However, the Pickering test will not always protect the whistleblower. As the Portercourt continued, "the chilling of even accurate
speech may be justified in certain extreme situations, for example, in
which the employee unduly breached confidentiality or disrupted
intimate working relationships.""15 The need for confidentiality in
the holders of such posicertain policy-making positions may exclude
6
tions from first amendment protection.1

111. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 570. The type of work done by the employer may
tip the balance against first amendment protection of an employee's criticism, see
Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311, 320-21 (3d Cir. 1977) (states may limit the
speech of police to a greater extent than they may that of citizens in general, without
infringing the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 903 (1978), as may the type of statement, see Swilley v. Alexander, 629 F.2d
1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1980) (criticism of professional competence less disruptive than a
personal attack); cf. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415
n.4 (1979) (public employer may place time, place and manner restrictions on
protected speech).
112. See Vaughn, supra note 32, at 638 (citing Williams v. Board of Regents, 629
F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 926 (1981)).
113. 592 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1979).
114. Id. at 773-74.
115. Id. at 774 (describing the Pickering balancing test). In a footnote later in its
opinion, the court indicated that "the lower court, in making the Pickering balance,
should ... determine and consider the extent to which the information Porter [who
alleged her disclosures were whistleblowing and were protected under the first
amendment] distributed . . . could have been distributed, in less disruptive ways."
Id. at 778 n.13.
116. See Besig v. Friend, 460 F. Supp. 134, 138-39 (N.D. Cal. 1978); see generally
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980) (bringing more "policymaking" positions
within first amendment protection; only where the hiring authority can show that
party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for performance of employee's job
may employee be dismissed based on political affiliation); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 367, 372 (1976) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (dictum; policy-makers may
be constitutionally dismissed based on their political affiliation); Coven, The First
Amendment Rights of PolicymakingPublic Employees, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
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In short, in determining whether employee speech is covered by the
first amendment, the courts have often tended to weigh heavily the
government interest in avoiding office disruption, and as a result have
sometimes rendered decisions against first amendment coverage."17 At
the time of enactment of the CSRA, Congress was aware of the chill
such decisions can put on whistleblowers; the legislators regarded the
then-existing protection afforded whistleblowers as inadequate and
passed the Act to provide additional protection."" Nevertheless, probationers who blow the whistle must rely on these generalized and
uncertain standards derived from Pickering.
Assuming, however, that an employee's speech is protected by the
first amendment, the same amendment should protect the employee
against retaliation for such speech."19 The probationer is entitled to a
trial in district court. 120 At that trial, the Mt. Healthy standard should
be applied.' 2
B. Due Process
Due process affords procedural protection to federal employees who
have been improperly deprived of liberty or property interests. 122

559 (1977) (arguing for increased first amendment protection of the speech of policymaking employees).
117. See Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 412 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa.), aJf'd, 546 F.2d 560
(3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 (1977); Vaughn, supra note 32, at 640.
118. See 124 CONG. REC. 27548 (S14280 (daily ed. Aug. 24, 1978)) (statement of
Sen. Sasser), reprinted in 2 HousE COMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE, 96TH
CONG.,

1ST SESS.,

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF

1978, at

1633 (Comm. Print 1979).
119. Vaughn, supra note 32, at 639; see Lowy, Constitutional Limitations on the
Dismissal of Public Employees, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1976).
120. Lowy, supra note 119, at 4 n.16. For a discussion of the limited extent of
procedural protection afforded by fifth amendment due process, see notes 122-36
infra and accompanying text. It should be noted that the district court's authority to
grant temporary injunctive relief before exhaustion of administrative civil service
remedies is very limited. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974).
121. See, e.g., Borrell, 682 F.2d at 991 (setting out the D.C. Circuit Court's
Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 715 (1977), test); but see the discussion of Jolly
v. Listerman at notes 133-36 infra and accompanying text.

122. Lowy, supra note 119, at 3. Since the publication of Professor Charles Reich's
article, The Netv Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964), the Supreme Court has developed the idea that procedural due process guarantees extend to government-fostered
expectation interests in property and liberty. Such an interest was recognized in Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (teacher at state university has "implied" tenure,
and thus a due process property right, in his job). Even for non-probationers, who
have the civil service equivalent of tenure, protection of these government-fostered
expectation interests in property and liberty is limited, see, e.g., the discussion of
Jolly v. Listerman at notes 133-36 infra and accompanying text, and may vary
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Unlike the tenured employee, however, the probationary employee is
unlikely to have a due process interest in his job. 23 A probationary
employee normally can be fired with a minimum of procedural requirements, 124 and thus would not ordinarily have the sort of expectation of future enjoyment of property that would justify a claim that
25
his due process rights had been denied.1
Of course, if the agency violates its rules, or a federal statute, the
probationer may have a claim that his due process interests have been
violated.126 As the District of Columbia Circuit Court held in Maza127
leski v. Treusdell,
[p]rocedural rules, such as those promulgated by [an agency] to
govern its personnel actions, are binding upon the agency issuing
them ....

This obligation to comply with established procedural

standards applies even where the employee, in the absence of such
discharged at any time
standards, could have been summarily
2
without procedural safeguards.

It has been held, however, that a statute which grants an employee
due process rights can by its terms limit the process which is due. In
Arnett v. Kennedy,12 a statute granted a non-probationary employee
a due process "expectation" that he would not be fired except for
prescribed reasons. Three Supreme Court justices held that the statute
creating this due process right had effectively limited the employee's
due process remedy to a post-termination hearing. 130
depending on the facts of a particular case. Lowy, supra note 119, at 3. The fifth
amendment provides: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
123. See Jolly v. Listerman, 672 F.2d 935, 941 (D.C. Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 450 (1982).
124. 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.803-.805 (1982) (OPM regulations).
125. Lowy, supra note 119, at 6 n.24.
126. Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-52 (1974) (opinion of Rehnquist,
J.) (non-probationary employee had a "statutory expectation" that he could not be
removed other than for prescribed reasons); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344
(1976) (a property interest in continued employment may be created by statute or
contract).
127. 562 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
128. Id. at 718 n. 38 (citations omitted); see also Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535,
539 (1959) (employee who could have been discharged summarily and without cause
may not be fired in contravention of agency regulations); but see the discussion of
Jolly v. Listerinan at notes 133-36 infra and accompanying text.
129. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
130. Id. at 151-52 (1974) (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). Two other justices also
concluded that due process was satisfied by a post-termination hearing, but on
different grounds. Id. at 164-71 (opinion of Powell, J.). As to the various standards
applied by the different justices to determine what process is due, see Lowy, supra
note 119, at 16-18.
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In sum, while statutes or an agency's regulations may create a due
process expectation that the probationer will not be fired for prohibited reasons, there is typically no due process property right in the
probationer's retention of his position past the end of the probationary
period.13 ' As to the extent of the probationer's "liberty" rights, it is
clear that if his dismissal involves alleged dishonesty or other misconduct amounting to moral turpitude, and there is communication to
others, the liberty interest is implicated and he would be entitled to a
132
due process hearing to clear his name.
Even for non-probationers there is a question whether due process
grants a meaningful remedy when the employing agency retaliates
against them for whistleblowing. In Jolly v. Listerman,133 the employing agency's original reasons for terminating the plaintiff in 1974 were
found to be constitutionally invalid. The agency had indicated in a
letter to the district court that the reasons not declared invalid were by
themselves enough to justify its original decision to terminate the
whistleblower. The Mt. Healthy standard was not applied; rather, the
circuit court simply held that the plaintiff's due process rights had
been satisfied by the administrative review he had received, and that,
under the test prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 34 the
court would not go further than to determine that the agency's action
in dismissing the plaintiff had not been "arbitrary and capricious." 135
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Jolly 36 lends support to
the conclusion that the first amendment and due process rights of the

131. But see Beeson v. Hudson, 630 F.2d 622, 626 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that if
a probationary employee is threatened with removal based on grounds that existed
prior to his appointment, that employee may have a qualified property interest in
continued employment); cf. Jolly v. Listerman, 672 F.2d at 941 (though an employee
is in a probationary period in his current job, he might have a due process property
interest in continued employment within the agency which employed him for a
number of years before he began his current job in the same agency).
132. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572-75 (1972) (discussing extent
of liberty interest); Burnett, A Survey of Significant Federal Court Decisions on the
Rights of Federal Employees Since the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 28 FED. BAR
NEWS & J. 218, 219 (1981) (citing Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1980);
Krause v. Small Business Admin., 502 F. Supp. 1332, 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
133. 672 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 450 (1982).
134. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
135. Jolly v. Listerman, 672 F.2d at 943 n.27.
136. 103 S. Ct. 450 (1982). One of the questions presented to the Supreme Court
in the petition for certiorari was:
2. Whether, after remand for reconsideration of decision to discharge a
federal employee on several grounds, some of which involve constitutionally-protected activity, the requirements of Mt. Healthy City School Dist.
Bd. of Education v. Doyle [citation omitted] are satisfied by a letter from
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whistleblower are vaguely defined and inadequate to protect him
against reprisal.
V. The Right of a Federal Employee to Sue His Supervisora Bivens-type Suit
Assuming a probationary whistleblower's constitutional rights have
137
been infringed by his supervisor's action, he may have a Bivens
claim against the supervisor. 138 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics,'39 the Supreme Court held that
violation of the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures by a federal agent acting under cover of his
federal authority gave rise to a cause of action for damages against the
agent. 140 The Court, noting that "damages have been regarded as the
ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty,"''
thus ruled that a federal employee could be liable in damages for
injury resulting from his invasion of another person's constitutional
rights. 142
The Court's current standard for determining whether a Bivens
43
action may be inferred in a given case is set out in Carlsonv. Green.1
Under this standard, victims of a 6onstitutional violation by a federal
agent are presumed to have a cause of action for damages against the
agent. 144 In either of two "situations," however, the cause of action
may be precluded. First, the victim may be denied a Bivens action if
the defendant demonstrates" 'special factors counselling hesitation [in

agency management asserting that the remaining, unprotected, grounds
were sufficient to justify the discharge.
Petition for Certiorari at i, Jolly v. Listerman, 672 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g
denied, 675 F.2d 1308, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 450 (1982).
137. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
138. See notes 103-36 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the extent of
constitutional protection accorded probationary whistleblowers.
139. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
140. Id. at 389. The Supreme Court has held that government officials' violations
of other constitutional rights may trigger Bivens actions for damages against the
official: Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (gender-based employment discrimination claim arising in a Congressman's staff implies a fifth amendment due process
right of action); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (Bivens action allowed for
violation of the eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment).
141. 403 U.S. at 395.
142. Id. at 397.
143. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
144. Id. at 18.
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inferring a Bivens action] in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress.' "'41 Second, a Bivens action may be precluded when the
defendant shows that Congress has "provided an alternative remedy
which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly
46
under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective." 1
Unfortunately, neither of these two "situations" has been very well
defined by the Court. As to the "special factors," the Court's opinions
offer little guidance as to just what factors would justify withholding a
Bivens remedy.' 47 In the only one of the Supreme Court's Bivens-type
cases to find such concerns-created by defendant's status as a member of Congress in Davis v. Passman'41-they
were not discussed
except for the Court's holding that "these concerns are coextensive
with the protections afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause.' 49
That holding is not helpful in the case of a whistleblower whose
employer is one of the federal agencies covered by the CSRA.
Similarly, as to the "explicit declar[ation]" by Congress, the Court
does not make very clear just what Congress would have to say to
"explicitly declare" an alternative remedy to be a "substitute" for, and
50
viewed equally effective as, a Bivens remedy.
Under this standard, three circuit courts have been asked to decide
whether a federal civilian employee has a Bivens action for damages
against his supervisor who allegedly violated the employee's constitutionally protected rights.'15 Two circuits have answered this question
in the negative, 52 and one in the affirmative. 153 The two courts
denying a Bivens action found that non-Bivens remedies were available that could give the plaintiff employee meaningful relief. 54 The
145. Id. (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396; citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
245 (1979)).
146. 446 U.S. at 18-19 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
at 245-47).
147. Bush v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct.
3481 (1982).
148. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
149. Id. at 246.
150. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 19 n.5, 18-19. "To satisfy this [second
situation] test, petitioners need not show that Congress recited any specific 'magic
words.' . . . Instead, our inquiry at this step in the analysis is whether Congress has
indicated that it intends the statutory remedy to replace, rather than to complement,
the Bivens remedy." Id. at 19 n.5.
151. See notes 103-36 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the extent of
constitutional protection accorded probationary whistleblowers.
152. Bush v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 3481
(1982); Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349, 357 (8th Cir. 1980).
153. Sonntag v. Dooley, 650 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1981).
154. See Bush v. Lucas, 647 F.2d 573, 577 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S.
Ct. 3481 (1982); Bishop v. Tice, 622 F.2d 349, 357 (8th Cir. 1980).
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court recognizing a Bivens action found that no other available action
could afford meaningful relief. 155
In Bush v. Lucas, 15 a first amendment case involving an alleged
retaliation against a tenured federal employee's whistleblowing, the
Fifth Circuit held that the government employer-employee relationship in the case constituted a "special factor which counsels hesitation
in recognizing a constitutional cause of action [for damages] in the
absence of affirmative action by Congress."' 157 Noting that such a
aggrieved employees to bypass the
cause of action might encourage
"very comprehensive" scheme 158 which the government had carefully
designed to balance the employee's rights against the government's
interest in efficiency,159 the court refused to recognize a Bivens action.
Although the court might have inferred a Bivens remedy had the
plaintiff been without other meaningful remedies, 160 the statutory and
administrative remedies available to civil servants convinced the court
that the government employer-employee relationship precluded a
cause of action for damages.16 ' The Supreme Court has granted certio62
rari. 1
In Bishop v. Tice, 16 3 the Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion on similar grounds. The court found that the plaintiff, a tenured
employee who alleged he had been constructively discharged in violation of his fifth amendment due process rights, had an administrative
remedy without inferring the availability of a Bivens cause of
action. 6 4 Finding a " 'special factor counseling hesitation' " in the

155. See Sonntag v. Dooley, 650 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 1981). The Supreme
Court noted the lack of any other meaningful remedy when it recognized Bivens
actions in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979) (since Davis' employer Passman, who fired her in violation of the fifth amendment, was no longer a Congressman, equitable relief was not available to restore her job; the only meaningful relief
would be damages-in a Bivens action), and in Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, 410 (1971)
(Harlan, J.,concurring) (for the Bivens plaintiff, damages would provide the only
meaningful relief).
156. 647 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 3481 (1982).
157. Id. at 577.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 576-77.
160. Id. at 577.
161. Bush, 647 F.2d at 575-76. The court did not reach the question "whether
Congress intended the civil service remedies to be an equally effective substitute for a
Bivens remedy," id. at 577; had the court found that Congress did so intend, this
could have been an alternative ground on which to preclude a Bivens remedy for the
government employee whistleblower. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 18-19.
162. 102 S. Ct. 3481 (1982).
163. 622 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1980).
164. Id. at 357.
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existence of civil service remedies, the court held that a Bivens-type
action was precluded.',
The Seventh Circuit in Sonntag v. Dooley,16 however, reached a
contrary conclusion, based largely on the fact that civil service statutes
and rules, which if applicable would have afforded reinstatement and
back pay, could not give the plaintiff meaningful relief. 6 7 Claiming
under the fifth amendment, the plaintiff, a former tenured employee,
alleged that the defendants had used various "extra-legal" means to
obtain her retirement by destroying her health until she was forced to
leave her job under her doctor's orders. Unable to work due to ill
health, she could obtain relief only in the form of damages-in a
Bivens action. 68 The court inferred the Bivens cause of action, holding that neither of the Supreme Court's criteria16 for denying such an
action was applicable. According to the Seventh Circuit, the defendants had not demonstrated " 'special factors counselling hesitation' "
because they did not enjoy" 'such independent status in our constitutional scheme as to suggest that judicially created remedies against
them might be inappropriate,' 170 and Congress had not provided
"'an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute
for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally
effective.' "71
Given the standard articulated in Carlson v. Green, 72 the Supreme
Court's pending decision in Bush v. Lucas, 173 as to whether the government employee whistleblower has a Bivens claim against his superior, will depend in large part on Congress' intent in passing the civil
service laws, including the CSRA. Weighing against a Bivens claim is

165. 622 F.2d at 357.
166. 650 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1981).
167. Id. at 907. Sonntag, like Bishop, alleged that her retirement had been coerced; the Sonntag court found, contrary to the finding in Bishop, that the civil
service regulations relied on in Bishop afforded no relief as they had been superseded
by inapplicable regulations. Id.; see Bishop, 622 F.2d at 356. However, the real basis
for the Sonntag court's decision to infer a Bivens cause of action was that the plaintiff
could not have benefited from any relief other than damages. See Sonntag, 650 F.2d
at 907.
168. 650 F.2d at 907.
169. 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980). See discussion at notes 143-50 supra and accompanying text.
170. 650 F.2d at 907 (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 19).
171. Id. (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980) (emphasis in
original)).
172. See notes 143-50 supra and accompanying text.
173. 647 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 3481 (1982).
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the rationale of the Bush and Bishop courts-that the complex, carefully balanced administrative scheme created by the CSRA constitutes
a " 'special factor counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative
action by Congress.' "174 It is an established principle that the federal
government has a special interest in the efficient administration of its
internal affairs.1 75 As the Supreme Court said in Pickering, "the State
has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees
that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general."'7 6 Considering
the complexity of civil service legislation, and the extent to which the
government administrative protections do guard against deprivation
of the constitutional rights of government employees, 77 the government's interest in efficiency of operation might well be considered a
"special factor" that would in most cases preclude a Bivens action. Of
course, in an extreme case such as Sonntag v. Dooley, 7s where the
defendants' actions have allegedly rendered the plaintiff incapable of
benefiting from any non-Bivens remedies that could be afforded
her, 7 a Bivens remedy may well be appropriate. Even assuming,
however, that the Supreme Court would be disposed to infer a Bivens
remedy on facts similar to those in Sonntag, most probationary whistleblower plaintiffs could not argue that retaliation for whistleblowing had rendered them incapable, as was the Sonntag plaintiff, of
benefiting from the type of remedy offered under existing administrative procedures. It might be argued, where OSC fails to appeal to the

174. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396;
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979)); see Bush, 647 F.2d at 576-77; Bishop,
622 F.2d at 357.
175. Bush, 647 F.2d at 576 (quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83 (1974)).
176. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
177. It should also be noted that after deciding in Carlson that neither of the
situations existed which could preclude a Bivens remedy, the Supreme Court considered four additional factors, all of which bolstered its conclusion that the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) did not preempt a Bivens action. 446 U.S. at 20-23. These
four factors were that the Bivens remedy served a deterrent purpose since it was
recoverable against individuals, id. at 21, that punitive damages may be awarded in
a Bivens action, id. at 22, that the plaintiff may opt for a jury in a Bivens action, id.
at 22-23, and that a Bivens action recognizes uniform rights for the plaintiff throughout the United States. Id. at 23. The FTCA offered the plaintiff none of these
benefits. Id. at 21-23.
The CSRA does offer a plaintiff two of these benefits. It acts as a deterrent to
retalitation against whistleblowers by providing for fines and other sanctions against
the offender, 5 U.S.C. § 1207(b) (Supp. V 1981); see Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21, and
provides uniform rules not dependent on state laws. Cf. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 23.
178. 650 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1981).
179. Id. at 907.
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MSPB the case of a deserving probationary whistleblower, that because the whistleblower has not in fact received the benefit of the
indirect administrative appeal provided by the Act,18 0 a Bivens action
should be inferred. Congress, however, carefully weighed competing
goals in deciding to grant the probationer only the indirect remedy of
appeal through OSC.
If the complex administrative procedures that Congress developed
for the civil service do in fact constitute a "special factor counselling
hesitation," there is presently little basis in the Supreme Court's decisions for predicting whether a probationary government employee
whistleblower will have a Bivens action against his superior. 8" Perhaps the Court in Bush will offer a refinement of its standard for
determining whether a Bivens action will lie. For example, the Court
might hold that existing civil service remedies do constitute a "special
factor counselling hesitation," and then go on to develop a test that
would allow for a Bivens action in some cases even in the presence of
such a factor. 182 This approach could harmonize the sensible but
apparently contradictory results in the circuit court cases. 183 It could
also give the probationary whistleblower a clearer indication as to
whether he is likely to have a Bivens action against his superior. In the
absence of such a standard, comparison of the facts and holdings in
Bush, Bishop, and Sonntag suggests that in most situations the ag18 4
grieved probationary whistleblower will not have a Bivens claim.

180. For a discussion of the administrative appeals procedures under the CSRA,
see notes 40-66 supra and accompanying text.
181. As previously noted, see notes 147-49 supra and accompanying text, the
Court's holding in Davis, 442 U.S. at 246, that the special factors counselling hesitation in that case were "coextensive with the protections afforded by the Speech or
Debate Clause," offers little guidance toward the resolution of the question whether
the probationary federal employee whistleblower has a Bivens action against his
superior.
182. The Court might decide that the Sonntag facts suggest a good basis for such a
standard. The standard could provide that despite the existence of a "special factor,"
a Bivens action for the employee would lie where the defendant's intentional action
has rendered the plaintiff incapable of benefiting from existing administrative remedies. Cf. Sonntag, 650 F.2d at 907 (allowing a Bivens action based on a finding that
civil service procedures did not constitute a special factor counselling hesitation).
183. Compare Sonntag, 650 F.2d at 907 (no special factors counselling hesitation)
with Bush, 647 F.2d at 576-77 (civil service administrative scheme is a special factor
counselling hesitation), [and] Bishop, 622 F.2d at 357 (same).
184. See discussion at notes 151-71 supra and accompanying text. Once a Bivens
action is inferred, the next issue is whether the defendants are immune. The Supreme
Court held in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), that though requiring the
defendants to defend a Bivens suit might inhibit their efforts to perform their duties,
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VI. Problems With the Functioning of the New
Administrative System

It is clear that, at least in the early stages of its existence, the Office
of the Special Counsel was not effectively protecting the whistleblowers who brought allegations of reprisals to OSC. Two cases involving probationary federal employee whistleblowers, which have
been passed on by the District of Columbia Circuit Court, have been
discussed. 185 In Wren, OSC closed the investigation without making
the preliminary inquiry required by the CSRA-to determine if the

they were sufficiently protected by a qualified immunity. Id. at 19. Similarly, the
Sonntag court suggested that the defendants in that case were entitled to no more
than a qualified immunity, and thus could not claim immunity to the Bivens suit in
that case. 650 F.2d at 907. The Supreme Court in Bivens had not reached the issue of
immunity, since the issue had not been preserved by the circuit court. 403 U.S. at
397. In every case allowing a Bivens remedy, however, the issue of federal employee
immunity from suit must necessarily arise; the Court addressed this issue in Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). The basic rule emerging from Butz was that if a
federal employee-even an executive official exercising discretion-violates a constitutionally created right and is sued for damages in a Bivens action, he is entitled only
to the qualified immunity specified in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S 232 (1974). Butz,
438 U.S. at 506-07. The Scheuer "qualified immunity" protected an executive officer
of a state government from liability for his acts depending on the scope of discretion
and responsibilities of his office, and on the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the act. 416 U.S. at 247. The Butz Court indicated that in the
absence of a contrary congressional direction, "there is no basis for according to
federal officials a higher degree of immunity from liability [for damages under the
Constitution] than is accorded state officials when sued for the identical violation
under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983." Id. at 500. The Court thus made clear that federal
officers may not "willfully or knowingly violate constitutional rights without fear of
liability." Id. at 495. Certain officials, however, whose functions require it, will be
absolutely immune from liability. Id. at 508. Among those absolutely immune by
virtue of their function are federal hearing examiners or administrative law judges,
id. at 513-14, agency officials performing functions analogous to that of a prosecutor
("those officials ... responsible for the decision to initiate or continue a proceeding
subject to agency adjudication"), id. at 516, and agency attorneys who arrange for
the presentation of evidence on the record during the course of adjudication. Id. at
517. To assess whether the holder of a given position is entitled to this absolute
immunity, two factors are relevant. First, it should appear that, unless he is granted
absolute immunity, the official's discretion might be distorted in a way that would
damage his ability to effectively carry out an important public policy. See, for
example, id. at 515 (discussing officials with responsibility for initiating administrative proceedings). Second, it is reassuring to the Supreme Court if the function of the
official granted absolute immunity provides him with certain guarantees of independence from conflicting interests. Such guarantees reduce the risk of his performing an
unconstitutional act and minimize the chance that the need will arise to bring a
Bivens action against him. See, for example, id. at 514 (discussing persons performing
adjudicatory functions within a federal agency).
185. Wren v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 681 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Borrell v.
United States Int'l Communications Agency, 682 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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complaint was meritorious. 8 In Borrell, OSC's finding that the plaintiff was fired for poor performance in her job was apparently erroneoils. 187

The OSC's handling of these cases is troubling, but what is worse is
that they appear not to be isolated cases. In a 1980 report, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that "[s]erious startup problems,
delays in case processing, poor communication with whistleblowers
and inadequate followup of agencies' responses to complaints jeopardize the Special Counsel's relationship with whistleblowers."'' 8 8 One
striking finding of the report deserves particular mention: The GAO
found that "[w]hen the Special Counsel's office receives an agency
report, the office does not determine the accuracy of the report. Nor
does the office determine if corrective action has or has not been
taken." 189
The GAO "believe[d] that the Special Counsel's office [was] taking
a narrow interpretation of its responsibilities in reviewing agency
reports."' 190 OSC's view was that unless it required an agency to
investigate an allegation in depth, the CSRA did not allow OSC to
take further action concerning the report, or even to comment on the
report's accuracy.191 To the extent that OSC elects not to question the
agency's report, the probationary whistleblower's CSRA protections
against reprisal are nullified. 192
Several reports, 193 including that of the GAO, indicate a number of
reasons for the poor performance of the OSC. First, the OSC has from
19 4
the start had very limited funding. For example, a July 1980 law
reduced the Special Counsel's office budget by almost fifty percent for
the fiscal year 1980.15 Although there has been a significant increase

186. 681 F.2d at 873-74; see notes 68-75 supra and accompanying text.
187. See 682 F.2d at 983-85, discussed at note 81 supra.
188. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL CAN IMPROVE
ITS MANAGEMENT OF WHISTLEBLOWER CASES, front cover (1980) [hereinafter cited as

GAO

REPORT].

189.
190.
191.
192.
appeal

Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
See notes 40-66 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the limited
rights of probationers under the CSRA.

193. See generally OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL

COUNSEL, ANNUAL REPORTS

(1979, 1980,

1981) (discussing various problems of OSC).
194. Pub. L. No. 96-304, 94 Stat. 857, 910 (1980).
195. OSC's budget was cut from $4.5 million to $2.5 million. GAO REPORT, supra
note 188, app. I, at 2; OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 2
(1981). Even for fiscal year 1984, OSC's budget is not expected to reach the $4.5
million level. Office of the Special Counsel, Analysis of Authorized Level for Fiscal
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in the number of permanent OSC employees since the GAO report
was filed,1 6 the budget increase in fiscal 1984 will be held to a
minimum level through a decrease of twenty-seven full-time positions
in OSC.117 This does not bode particularly well for OSC's future
performance.
OSC's performance also is not helped by its lack of independent
budget authority. In 1980, OSC sued the MSPB over the Board's
allocation of funds between OSC and MSPB.' 98 As the GAO underlined, "[t]he intended legal relationship [between MSPB and OSC] is
not clearly defined .
"..."I'll Thus, with respect to the budget, "the
Special Counsel's operations are influenced by administrative decisions of the Board-concerning office space, contracts, and procurement.

' 20 0

nel, and
OSC's
only one
of OSC.
share of

In sum, OSC's problems include a lack of funds, of person-

of independence from the MSPB.
constant shortage of funds and dependence on the MSPB is
side of the problem. The other is the low level of utilization
Although OSC is struggling to deal with its workload, its
the complaints being filed to all the various agencies is

Year 1984 (unpublished budget estimates table for 1984) [hereinafter cited as Budget
Estimates Table]. See also OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 3
(1980) (until it received a supplemental appropriation in August, 1979, the office was
hampered by lack of funds and staff); OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, 1981 ANNUAL
REPORT 1 (1982) (OSC was hampered by severe budgetary problems during 1981).
196. In 1980, the year the GAO made its report, OSC began the year with 48
permanent employees, and ended it with 94. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, 1980
ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1981). By fiscal year 1983, OSC had 113 full time positions.
Budget Estimates Table, supra note 195.
197. Budget Estimates Table, supra note 195. This decrease, from the previous
year's 113 to 86, is "consistent with the [Reagan] Administration's budget." Office of
the Special Counsel, Summary Justification of FY 1984 Budget Estimates 1 (undated
and unpublished) [hereinafter cited as Summary Justification]. See also id. at 2 ("The
Office of the Special Counsel has been beset by funding, staffing and leadership
problems since its inception").
198. See GAO REPORT, supra note 188, app. 1, at 3-4. See also OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL COUNSEL, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (initially, only one permanent private
office was allocated to OSC by the Board, which controlled office space. Overcrowding of staff, lack of privacy and somewhat unsafe office quarters were still problems
in mid-1980); OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (the staff in
OSC's central office in Washington, D.C. continued to work in crowded conditions
and open space throughout 1980); OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, 1981 ANNUAL
REPORT 2 (crowded conditions continued until October 1981 when OSC moved to
new office with adequate space).
199. GAO REPORT, supra note 188, app. I, at 3.
200. Id.
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minute. 20 1 It has been suggested that OSC should do more to encour20 2
age awareness among federal employees of its function and services,
but it has also been suggested that whistleblowers do not believe they
would be protected if they made allegations to OSC, 20 3 and/or that
20 4
they do not believe action would be taken if they made allegations.
OSC is working to change such perceptions. One promising sign is
OSC's "new priority" to "investigate every complaint received at least
to the extent of interview." 20 5 At the present, however, OSC has a
limited budget and is used by a very limited fraction of employees
20 6
reporting wrongdoing.
A recent article 20 7 points out the tendency of the CSRA whistleblower protections to afford legitimacy to whistleblowing, and thus to
improve the "administrative environment. ' 20 8 It suggests that "[i]f
agencies recognize the legitimacy of whistleblowing, legal protection
need not reach every case; internal procedures, both formal and
informal, will provide additional protection.1 20 9 Internal procedures
will no doubt help some whistleblowers, 210 but such procedures will
be of little solace to the probationary employee whistleblower who
may be surprised, not by the natural hostility of his management to
whistleblowing, but by the ineffectiveness with which the CSRA protects the "rights" it gives him to blow the whistle.
The probationary whistleblower's surprise would not be unreasonable, in light of the various recent government initiatives designed to
convince workers that the government is serious about eliminating
fraud and waste. 21 ' President Reagan has publicly stated his determi-

201. MSPB WHISTLEBLOWING REPORT, supra note 12, at 24 (survey showing that
when government employees report wrongdoing, less than 1 % report it to OSC).
202. See generally id. at 49-53 (discussing employees' knowledge of, and confidence in, various channels for reporting wrongdoing).
203. See id. at 53.
204. See id. at 27-28.
205. Summary Justification, supra note 197, at 2.
206. See note 201 supra and accompanying text.
207. Vaughn, supra note 32.
208. Id. at 663-64.
209. Id. at 664.

210.

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL,

1981

ANNUAL

REPORT

13-14.

211. For example, in March 1981, President Reagan signed an executive order
creating the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, which is designed to
improve cooperation among federal agencies in fighting fraud and waste. MSPB
WHISTLEBLOWING REPORT,

supra note 12, at ii. Late in 1981, the chairman of that

organization claimed that its efforts to encourage employees to report instances of
suspected fraud and mismanagement had resulted in an 80% increase in "hotline
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nation to change the attitude among employees that " 'nothing would
be done' " were they to report illegal or wasteful activity.2" 2 Most
importantly, OSC has been making increased efforts to inform federal
employees of its function and services.213
As employees become more knowledgeable about these various initiatives, they are likely to develop more confidence that action will be
taken to correct the problems a whistleblower exposes. 4 Similarly, as
they learn more about OSC, many will be convinced that OSC can
protect them from reprisal for whistleblowing. 21 5 A probationary employee who reacts to recent government exhortations by reporting
wrongdoing or waste should be protected.
VII. Recommendations
Congress apparently intended to preclude extensive judicial review
of OSC's decisions.21 6 In light of the congressional intent to remove
obstacles to the firing of incompetents, there is serious question as to
how much protection the courts can give probationary whistleblowers
under the Act. At a minimum, courts should strike down an arbitrary
and capricious refusal by OSC to conduct the statutorily mandated
investigation.217
More protection is certainly desirable for probationary whistleblowers, 21 s and given the administrative structure created by the

calls" and letters received by the member agencies. Letter to the author from Robin
Raborn of the OSC, Feb. 1, 1983. The Council on Integrity and Efficiency publicized a list of whistleblower hotline numbers set up by more than 20 departments and
agencies in the spring of 1981. MSPB WHISTLEBLOWING REPORT, supra note 12, at iii.
212. MSPB WHISTLEBLOWING REPORT, supra note 12, at iii (quoting a presidential
statement in reaction to an April 1981 preliminary draft of the MSPB Whistleblowing
Report).
213. Id. (during 1981, OSC "increased its outreach efforts by encouraging other
Federal agencies to inform their employees about the Special Counsel, and by widely
distributing informational posters and pamphlets").
214. Id. at 53, 55.
215. Id. at 53-54.
216. See notes 65-66 supra and accompanying text; Vaughn, supra note 32, at 660
n.254 (the focus of the Act on administrative relief, the failure to create a private
right of action, and the statutory scheme's structure support this conclusion).
217. See Vaughn, supra note 32, at 661 n.258, 660 n.254 (OSC's failure to pursue
a complaint may be "final agency action," subject to review under the Administrative Procedure Act's "arbitrary and capricious" standard); 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704, 706
(1976); discussion of the Wren case at notes 68-79 supra and accompanying text.
218. See discussion of the Borrell case at notes 80-86 supra and accompanying text,
and of the Wren case at notes 68-79 supra and accompanying text.
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CSRA, this protection should be provided in large part by OSC, in the
form of more aggressive investigation of whistleblower allegations and
protection of probationary whistleblowers' interests.2 19 To that end,
Congress should correct two ongoing problems-OSC's constant
budget constraints, 220 and its incomplete independence from the
Board. 22 1 With improved protection of whistleblowers by OSC, it is
likely that some probationary whistleblowers will be encouraged to
blow the whistle where they would otherwise not have done So.222 The
resulting savings would help pay for the cost of the proposed increase
223
in OSC's budget.
Such corrections, however, will not change the fact that OSC is not
an attorney for the whistleblower. 224 For example, OSC may decide
not to pursue a meritorious case if it feels that resources would be
better used elsewhere. 225 As a result, a probationary whistleblower is
left with the same pre-CSRA causes of action that Congress considered

219. See notes 185-92 supra and accompanying text.
220. See notes 193-97 supra and accompanying text.
221. See notes 198-200 supra and accompanying text.
222. Of federal employees questioned in a recent survey, 41 % reported that they
would be encouraged to report illegal or wasteful activity by knowledge that they
would be protected from reprisal. MSPB WHISTLEBLOWINc REPORT, supra note 12, at
57, 59.
223. The survey discussed in note 222 supra indicated that 45 % of federal employees claimed to have observed one or more instances of illegal or wasteful activity
during one year. Id. at 7. Of this 45 %, over half (52 %) claimed that the observed
activity involved more than $1,000 in federal funds or property. Id. Many said the
waste they had observed amounted to over $100,000. See id. at 12. Of those claiming
personal knowledge of fraud, waste, or mismanagement, 70% did not report the
misconduct. Id. at 21.
Making allowances for the fact that more than one employee may observe the same
wasteful incident, and recognizing that the data discussed above were drawn from a
sample not limited to probationary employees, it may nevertheless be concluded that
the government could profit by encouraging probationers to believe that they will be
protected from reprisal. See note 222 supra. If 45,000 (45%) of the 100,000 federal
employee probationers, see notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text, observe an
illegal or wasteful activity during one year, and if 52% of these activities involve at
least $1,000, see MSPB WHISTLEBLOWING REPORT, supra note 12, at 7, a minimum of
roughly $23,000,000 of waste is observed by these probationers-not allowing for
duplicate reporting of a given incident, but also not allowing for the fact that many
observed incidents of waste involve far more than $1,000. See id. at 12. If 70% of this
waste goes unreported, see id. at 21, the unreported amount observed by probationers may be estimated to be in the range of $16,000,,000 per year. This amount is
roughly 31/2 times OSC's entire budget for fiscal year 1984. See note 195 supra.
224. See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
225. Vaughn, supra note 32, at 660.
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inadequate to protect whistleblowers from reprisal. 226 OSC thus frustrates one of the Act's goals, the protection of whistleblowers. Moreover, it does not necessarily achieve the Act's other goal, the firing of
incompetents. Some limited judicial review is therefore desirable to
assure that OSC exercises its discretion in a manner that promotes the
22 7
goals of the CSRA.
VIII. Conclusion
A justifiable goal of the CSRA was to ensure that incompetent
employees could be fired from the federal civil service. Congress in
effect decreed that because of the need for efficiency in government,
probationary whistleblowers cannot be protected to the extent that
they should be. Under the CSRA, probationary federal employees are
in most cases denied the direct administrative appeal rights granted to
tenured employees, and must rely on OSC to appeal for them. The
OSC, designed to protect the integrity of the civil service system as a
whole, has not consistently protected the rights of the individual
probationer. Without corrective action by OSC, the probationary
whistleblower is left with the same pre-CSRA causes of action that
Congress considered inadequate to protect whistleblowers against reprisal. The most important of these causes of action are those deriving
from the Constitution. Unfortunately, however, the extent of the
probationary whistleblower's constitutional rights is determined by
uncertain and ill-defined standards. The probationer has no guarantee that the Constitution will adequately protect him from retaliation
for whistleblowing.
The structure of the administrative system set up by the CSRA
dictates that increased protection for the probationer should be provided largely by OSC. The OSC, however, has suffered from budget
constraints and from its lack of independent budget authority. Currently, OSC's staff is scheduled to be cut. Congress should correct
these problems. Given the small size of OSC's budget, a budget increase small in absolute terms would significantly enhance OSC's

226. Of course, courts may hold that the CSRA whistleblower provisions create in
the probationer a due process "statutory expectation" that he will not be fired in
retaliation for whistleblowing. See notes 122-36 supra and accompanying text.
227. See Vaughn, supra note 32, at 660 n.254 (citing Berger, Administrative
Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969)). For example, should a court
find that OSC is too acquiescent towards certain sister government agencies, it should
claim jurisdiction and review the case to ascertain whether OSC is basing its decisions
on proper grounds.
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ability to protect probationary whistleblowers. The mere existence of
OSC probably encourages employees to blow the whistle; more effective protection of whistleblowers by OSC is likely to encourage more
whistleblowing by probationers. Increased whistleblowing would
result in savings that would pay for part or all of the cost of increasing
OSC's budget.
Finally, some limited judicial review of OSC's actions is necessary
to ensure that OSC does not arbitrarily refuse to enforce the probationer's CSRA whistleblowing rights. Even assuming, however, that
such judicial review is made available, the limited nature of the
probationer's CSRA rights suggests that he would be wise not to blow
the whistle until the end of the probationary period. At that time, the
CSRA appeal rights will protect him far better than a necessarily
limited judicial review of OSC's administrative actions.
Benjamin C. Indig

